Uranium from Christopher Hitchens' bottom

"He was quite cutting about the claim that uranium had been sought from Africa. ... My source believed that the documents on which the allegation rested were forged." — Former BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan, June 19 2003

"We know that in the 1980s Iraq purchased more than 270 tonnes of uranium from Niger. Therefore, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility - let us at least put it like that - that Iraq went back to Niger again. That is why I stand by entirely the statement that was made in the September dossier." — Prime Minister Tony Blair, July 16 2003

"Iraq's a big place and there's lots of sand. ... It is impractical to dig up the whole of Iraq, but for somebody to say we are absolutely certain that there is nothing there would be a very rash and unfounded thing to say, in our judgment." — Lord Butler of Brockwell, July 14 2004

~~~~~

Did Iraqi diplomat Wissam al-Zahawie go uranium shopping in Niger? Christopher Hitchens certainly thinks so (the man will not shut up about it).

It is not my intention to refute all he has written, however I thought it would be a good idea to examine one or two of his most recent statements (highlighted here in bold). And so in no particular order, Hitchens writes...

"The subsequent mysteriously forged documents claiming evidence of an actual deal made between Zahawie and Niger were circulated well after the first British report... The original British report carefully said that Saddam had 'sought' uranium, not that he had acquired it."

The same British report in draft form said that Iraq had "purchased" large quantities of uranium (see here pages 6 and 29). Paul Waugh, Deputy Political Editor of The Independent, wrote upon learning of this crucial detail:

The controversial claim that Iraq bought uranium from Africa was stated as fact in an early draft of the Government's dossier, new documents before the Hutton inquiry show.

The revelation that the claim was originally much stronger will fuel suspicions that Britain was forced to amend its dossier after warnings from the CIA that the Niger link was unproven.

It also suggests that the UK was so anxious to portray Saddam as a nuclear threat that it decided to keep even a weakened version of the allegation in its dossier.

"Since the war in Iraq began, two independent British inquiries have firmly reiterated that the original intelligence concerning Niger was sound, and has withstood careful scrutiny..."

The Foreign Affairs Select Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2002-03 did not conclude likewise.

This might be a little tedious but allow me to reproduce select portions of noteworthy memoranda and minutes of evidence from British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (accompanied by William Ehrman) before that committee. There is a serious point to be made below.

SECTION ONE: WITH REFERENCE TO THE DOCUMENT IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

[...]

Question: Did the "significant quantities of uranium" evidence come from a single source, or from mutually corroborating multiple sources? Was there any corroboration at all for this claim? (Did the US accept that the claim was sound?) Are you satisfied that documents on this are genuine?

Answer: The document stated on p 25 that "there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa." This reference drew on intelligence reporting from more than one source. We understand that the IAEA acquired documents on this subject in February 2003. At no stage prior to the publication of the dossier did the UK possess or have sight of these documents. The IAEA have confirmed that the documents were not provided by the UK, contrary to some media reporting. Since the publication of the dossier, we have had the opportunity to examine the documents. Some of these documents are forgeries, others are still under consideration.

Q: Was the wording of the "significant quantities of uranium" claim given on p 25 of the document Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, exactly the same as it was in the intelligence assessment supplied to the Government? If so, was it accompanied in the intelligence assessment by qualifications not included in the public document?

A: The reporting post dated the last JIC assessment of Saddam's nuclear programme. But the language used in the document was approved by the JIC.

[...]

Q: How was the original evidence in support of the "significant quantities of uranium" claim tested? When did Ministers conclude that some of the evidence was unreliable? Does there remain any reliable evidence for this claim?

A: See above. The information about the forged documents first emerged in February 2003 when the IAEA declared documents it had received concerning the Iraq/uranium/Niger issue were fabricated. We cannot comment on the origin or history of these documents. As noted above, the statement in the dossier drew on intelligence reporting from more than one source. This intelligence remains under review.

And the same again, only this time minutes of evidence:

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES (QUESTIONS 1260-1279)

Sir John Stanley: What was the date, Foreign Secretary, on which the British Government complied with its obligations under the two Security Council resolutions and passed the firm intelligence that it had, which underpinned what was in the September 2002 document, to the IAEA?

Mr Straw: I will ask Mr Ricketts and Mr Ehrman to give more detail, but–

Sir John Stanley: I just want the date, I do not want a long response. I am just asking a very simple question. I am asking your officials if you cannot give the answer. I want to know, please, the date, that is all I am asking for. What was the date on which the British Government complied with its Security Council obligations to pass information on to the IAEA?

Mr Straw: I am going to give an answer and, if I may, I will give the answer in my own way…

Sir John Stanley: [...] We are talking about fresh intelligence which came to your Government and which underpinned putting into the September 2002 dossier the detailed statements that were made in emphatic terms about uranium supplies to Africa. That intelligence was under the obligation of your Government to pass on to the IAEA. When was it done?

Mr Ehrman: The intelligence came from a foreign service and we understand that it was briefed to the IAEA in 2003.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office later submitted in written evidence further supplementary answers to questions raised by the FAC during oral session.

IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO PROCURE URANIUM

1. The statement in the Government's published Assessment on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that Iraq sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa was based on intelligence information received in 2002 from more than one source. We did not have intelligence that Iraq had actually acquired uranium: the dossier was clear on this point.

2. We asked the originators of our intelligence information to discuss this issue with the IAEA. We understand that this was done shortly before the IAEA report of 7 March 2003.

[...]

To summarise: At no stage prior to the publication of the September 2002 dossier – in which Iraq is categorically said to have sought the supply of substantial quantities of uranium from Africa – did the British government "possess" or "have sight" of the forged documents. The government's assessment was based on foreign intelligence reporting received in 2002 from more than one source – this information remains under review. The question "did the United States accept that the claim was sound" goes ignored, however the British government asked the originators of their intelligence information to discuss the issue with the IAEA, which they understand was done shortly before the IAEA report of March 7, 2003.

The committee smelt a rat:

60. We conclude that it is very odd indeed that the Government asserts that it was not relying on the evidence which has since been shown to have been forged, but that eight months later it is still reviewing the other evidence. The assertion "…that Iraq sought the supply of significant amounts of uranium from Africa …" should have been qualified to reflect the uncertainty. (Report)

When in January 2004 Lynne Jones MP wrote the Secretary of State to ask whether or not the British government had asked the owners of their intelligence if they may be permitted to share it with selected third parties, possibly in the hope of having it widely tested, Jack Straw once more confirmed that this specific reporting had already been briefed to the IAEA: "The government asked the originators of the intelligence that Iraq sought the supply of uranium from Africa to discuss the issue with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The government understand this was done shortly before the IAEA report of 7 March 2003. I am withholding further details of intelligence exchanges with allies under Exemption 1(c) of Part 2 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information."

Lynne Jones subsequently contacted the IAEA to question whether a third party had discussed or shared separate intelligence with them and, if so, what assessment they made of it. IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky responded to Jones in May 2004: "I can confirm to you that we have received information from a number of member states regarding the allegation that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Niger. However, we have learned nothing which would cause us to change the conclusion we reported to the United Nations Security Council on March 7, 2003 with regards to the documents assessed to be forgeries and have not received any information that would appear to be based on anything other than those documents."

The IAEA had carefully pieced all of the fragmented evidence together. They interviewed Zahawie separately. It all collapsed under scrutiny. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei's statement to the UN Security Council can still be found on the IAEA website along with his Fifteenth Consolidated Report.

But you must forget about all of that. Forget it. Instead Hitchens would rather turn your attention to a second British inquiry – one altogether more supportive. It was conducted by the Intelligence and Security Committee and chaired by former Labour cabinet minister Ann Taylor (more on her shortly). "It is frankly not a very good report," journalist Michael Smith told me. I agree with him. Nevertheless, the report threw up some interesting details that otherwise might never have escaped into the light. Pages 27-28 of their succinct report reads:

THE 24 SEPTEMBER 2002 DOSSIER

Uranium from Africa

87. The claim that Iraq had expressed an intention to obtain uranium from Africa was not included in the JIC Assessments prior to September 2002. The SIS told the Committee that this was because the initial intelligence was not acquired until June 2002 and the JIC did not produce an assessment on the Iraqi nuclear programme between June and September. However, the intelligence was included in the Iraqi WMD paper that was circulated for comment in August and in the first draft of the dossier, produced on 10 September.

88. In the foreword to the dossier the Prime Minister said:

"What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam… continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons."

The executive summary states that:

"As a result of the intelligence, we judge that Iraq has…. sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear programme that could require it,"

while the main body of the text stated that:

"… there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

89. The Committee questioned the Chief of the SIS about the reporting behind these statements. We were told that it came from two independent sources, one of which was based on documentary evidence. One had reported in June 2002 and the other in September that the Iraqis had expressed interest in purchasing, as it had done before, uranium from Niger. GCHQ also had some sigint concerning a visit by an Iraqi official to Niger.

90. The SIS's two sources reported that Iraq had expressed an interest in buying uranium from Niger, but the sources were uncertain whether contracts had been signed or if uranium had actually been shipped to Iraq. In order to protect the intelligence sources and to be factually correct, the phrase "Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa" was used. At the time of producing the dossier, nothing had challenged the accuracy of the SIS reports.

91. In February 2003 the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) received from a third party (not the UK) documents that the party had acquired in the autumn of 2002 and which purported to be evidence of Iraq's attempts to obtain uranium from Niger. In March 2003 the IAEA identified some of the documents it had received as forgeries and called into question the authenticity of the others.

92. The third party then released its documents to the SIS. The SIS then contacted its source to check the authenticity of its documentary evidence. The SIS told us that its source was still conducting further investigations into this matter.

93. The SIS stated that the documents did not affect its judgement of its second source and consequently the SIS continues to believe that the Iraqis were attempting to negotiate the purchase of uranium from Niger.

Now you might want to read that again because the significance of this cannot be underestimated. Blogger Josh Marshall: "By saying the [unauthentic] documents didn't affect the judgment on the second source, we can fairly infer that they did affect the judgment of the first." And so, with a single question, the Intelligence and Security Committee learn from the Secret Intelligence Service what the Foreign Affairs Committee could not get out of Jack Straw in ten - a thinly veiled admission that a major piece of intelligence was in some way connected to the forgeries, and therefore unsound.

This must remain a sore point because key officials refuse to answer precision-guided smart-questions regarding the exact nature of this intelligence, nor will they openly talk about the investigation pertaining to the authenticity of said evidence (the ex-chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee is also ignoring all such requests for answers).

And so I think we have enough information to tentatively conclude that the British most likely received a written summary and/or a verbatim copy of the bogus document(s). This would mean Jack Straw was not necessary lying when he said at no time prior to the publication of the dossier did the UK "possess" or "have sight" of the forgeries (i.e. the original source material). It would appear, however, that Prime Minister Tony Blair crossed way over the line when he said: "The evidence that we had that the Iraqi Government had gone back to try to purchase further amounts of uranium from Niger did not come from these so-called 'forged' documents, they came from separate intelligence."

Also take a moment to consider the following point. If, as Jack Straw declared, they had "absolutely no knowledge of any documents relating to this area being forged" until March 2003, then what possible reason can they provide for shunning what must therefore have appeared to be perfectly good intelligence material, particularly at a time when they were desperately soliciting as much evidence as possible? They cannot have it both ways, nor can they seriously claim they were out of the loop.

We now move forward in time to the Butler Review. A five-member panel of privy counsellors hand-picked from inside Number 10 Downing Street, this inquiry had only the single backing of Tony Blair's New Labour party (the Liberal Democrats declined to take part, predicting "another whitewash" because the role of politicians had been excluded from the inquiry's remit, and the Conservative Party withdrew their support soon after). The committee also met entirely in secret and its terms of reference were so tightly drawn it guaranteed the key questions the British people were asking could not be fully answered.

Although highly critical in parts, the Butler Report eventually cleared ministers – and, by extension, George Bush – of making unfounded statements on the specific issue of uranium. This did not come as a surprise to the committee's critics, who suggested the review lacked integrity. And not without good reason. A year earlier, on the day of the publication of the ISC report, committee member Michael Mates adjudged that there had been no misconduct or wrongdoing and that misunderstanding stemmed from the government's honest desire to enlighten the public in a manner not attempted before: "This is the first time ever that a Government has put sensitive intelligence into the public domain." No blame should be apportioned to any individual politician or intelligence officer, added the former Guards colonel. He was seen as a safe pair of hands and an obvious choice for any new investigation. Much worse, Ann Taylor was one of a select few people trusted enough by Tony Blair to receive an early draft of the September 2002 dossier, which she helped shape and fashion. Private Eye magazine underscored the absurdity of her appointment to the Butler Review panel:

On 18 September 2002 an official in Blair's office sent this memo to chief of staff Jonathan Powell and Alastair Campbell: "The PM has asked Ann Taylor to read through the dossier in draft and give us any comments. He stressed that it is for her and for her only and that no one else outside this building was seeing it in draft. I'm contacting John Scarlett to work out how this should happen – needs to be tomorrow."

Taylor went to Scarlett's office at 8 o'clock the next morning, read the dossier and gave her comments to the spy chief – who then passed them on to Blair. She advised that it "needs to come across as an impartial, professional assessment of the threat", and that the PM should "undercut critics" by explaining why Saddam should be stopped now.

So the only person outside No 10 and the JIC who was trusted to help with the dossier (and who also expressed a wish to see Blair's critics undercut) is now sitting on the inquiry into its contents. One wonders why Blair didn't go the whole hog and add Alastair Campbell to Lord Butler's team of independent inquisitors.

Was the appointment of Taylor a secondary attempt at damage limitation? I do believe so. As Lynne Jones correctly observed: "It is self-evidently bad practice to appoint someone to a committee when their previous conclusions are under scrutiny."

"According to Mark Huband, the national security correspondent of the Financial Times, in an important front-page article he wrote on June 28, 2004, the consensus among European intelligence services was that Niger was attempting to deal in yellowcake with anyone it could find, from North Korea to Iran."

I am well aware of that front-page article and at least one important other. Several days later, presumably after being briefed by a source close to the Prime Minister, Mark Huband exclusively revealed that the Butler Inquiry was set to vindicate the government and endorse its handling of uranium intelligence material. That Huband most likely received his inside information directly from Downing Street should be of noted concern.

In his June 28 piece, Huband delivered the information that, from 1999 onwards, unidentified sources had picked up repeated discussion of an unlawful trade in uranium from Niger:

The FT has now learnt that three European intelligence services were aware of possible illicit trade in uranium from Niger between 1999 and 2001. Human intelligence gathered in Italy and Africa more than three years before the Iraq war had shown Niger officials referring to possible illicit uranium deals with at least five countries, including Iraq.

"The same information was passed to the United States", Huband added only later.

Nuclear trafficking is of course a very serious concern and experience tells counter-proliferation units to stay vigilant. However, this specific reporting advanced no proof that Saddam had anything to do with these unidentified rogue traders – real or imagined. Rather, it seems that various individuals simply deduced that Iraq might be a potentially interested partner.

James Astill also reported seeing similar evidence in 2002. The CIA questioned the sourcing and after careful investigation uncovered evidence that directly contradicted the original reporting. Yet, the Butler committee (and Hitchens) expect us to accept reporting that is so plainly unreliable even the Bush administration was compelled to drop it. More precisely, the Butler Report states that "there was further and separate intelligence that in 1999 the Iraqi regime had also made inquiries about the purchase of uranium ore in the Democratic Republic of Congo." In this case, "there was some evidence that by 2002 an agreement for a sale had been reached."

Agreeing with the American assessment is Professor Hugues Leclercq, a specialist of the Democratic Republic of Congo's economy and mining sector, who said that the British accusation amounted to "pure fantasy". The uranium mine in question is at Shinkolobwe in the southern province of Katanga; the material there was used to make the atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In the 1960s its two main uranium shafts were flooded and sealed with concrete blocks after the deposit had been extensively mined-out, rendering any remaining ore completely inaccessible. In the late 1990s and early 2000, cobalt mining was permitted adjacent to the old site, which led to uncontrolled and dangerous mining activities. Prof. Leclercq says trace elements of uranium might be found in the surrounding area but it is very doubtful that illicit excavation would produce anything other than minimal results. Lacking hard evidence, "I'm sure that not a single UN inspector" could believe the British material, he told New African magazine.

In July 2003, National Security Council spokesman Michael N. Anton confirmed that the Americans had separate sources of information too. However, the "other reporting that suggested that Iraq had tried to obtain uranium from Africa [was] not detailed or specific enough for us to be certain that such attempts were in fact made. Because of this lack of specificity," he continued, "this reporting alone did not rise to the level of inclusion in a presidential speech…".

This assorted intelligence reporting was every bit as flimsy, and so it is of some interest that Lord Butler felt the need to drag it back up.

"In order to take the Joseph Wilson view of this Baathist ambassadorial initiative, you have to be able to believe that Saddam Hussein's long-term main man on nuclear issues was in Niger to talk about something other than the obvious."

Of course, on that particular trip, Wissam al-Zahawie visited not just Niger but also Burkina Faso, Benin and Congo-Brazzaville. As Cambridge University academic Glen Rangwala explains, Iraq would

send delegations all over the world, including Africa, to sign free trade agreements. The Iraqis weren't really interested in trade, but in getting sanctions lifted. They were holding out the promise of cheap oil to buy the votes of poor countries which might end up on the Security Council. Their main strategy was to isolate the US and Britain on the sanctions issue.

But let's turn this around and fire it straight back at Hitchens. If Saddam was covertly shopping around for uranium, would he really send his top "long-term main man on nuclear issues" to go and secure it? Zahawie posed freely for photographers and his picture was published in a local paper. The trip was also reported by at least one European press agency. Hitchens need not answer the question since he stands accused of overstating Zahawie's knowledge and experience in this field. Zahawie has himself twice replied to Hitchens and on both occasions he addressed this and many other points.

Not that we should uncritically take Zahawie at his word. As the International Atomic Energy Agency correctly assessed before the war, and what we can now state with absolute certainty, Iraq did not have an active nuclear programme, nor did it have the means or resources to restart a project of such magnitude any time soon. No enrichment facilities existed in Iraq with which to process natural uranium into weapons grade material. So why risk being discovered negotiating for material you can do nothing with? And exactly how would a massive shipment of radioactive material make it from Niger to Iraq without being detected? As Private Eye reports, a previously classified paper written by US intelligence says that

an alleged plan for "500 tons" of uranium "to be delivered [in two phases] in one year" was unlikely because it would mean "25 hard to conceal 10-ton tractor trailers would be used to transport the off-the-books uranium. Because Niger is landlocked, the convoy would have to cross at least one international border and travel at least 1,000 miles to reach the sea. Moving such a quantity over such a distance would be very difficult, particularly because the French would be indisposed to approve or cloak this arrangement". Even if the US did not fully share these words with British Intelligence, the UK could easily have made the same calculations, and seen that the claims in Blair's September Dossier were implausible...

The Butler Report acknowledges the destruction and dismantlement of all facilities built to "process, enrich and fabricate uranium" and the removal of "all potentially fissile material" from Iraq. It then states that "some unprocessed uranium ore" was left in the country. However this is not entirely correct. As theoretical physicist and nuclear expert Professor Norman Dombey pointed out, over 500 tonnes of uranium compound including yellowcake – uranium that has undergone the first stage of processing – remained under lock and key at Iraq's gutted Tuwaitha nuclear research center:

Iraq already had far more uranium than it needed for any conceivable nuclear weapons programme. ... Nuclear weapons are difficult and expensive to build not because uranium is scarce, but because it is difficult and expensive to enrich U235 from 0.7 per cent to the 90 per cent needed for a bomb. Enrichment plants are large, use a lot of electricity and are almost impossible to conceal. Neither British security services nor the CIA seriously thought Iraq had a functioning enrichment plant that would have justified all the noise about nuclear weapons we heard before the war.

When I read of the supposed Iraqi purchase of uranium from Niger, I thought it smelt distinctly fishy. ... It was a gigantic red herring.

It would have been infinitely easier if Saddam had simply reclaimed the material already sitting in Iraq. Of course, under ever-watchful eyes, none of this was ever going to happen. The very idea of Iraq reconstructing a nuclear programme is absurd. The most important thing for the warmongers, however, was having a seed of doubt firmly planted in the public mind.

The report concedes, "the CIA advised caution about any suggestion that Iraq had succeeded in acquiring uranium from Africa," but they, "agreed that there was evidence that it had been sought." These are weasel words. Every degree of light upon a subject can be classed as evidence, but evidence is not necessarily proof. For this reason CIA correctly discouraged White House officials from making any such allegation. Alas, the British went out on a limb.

And at least one other important distinction needs to be made. Contrary to what Hitchens claims, the Butler Committee did not say the intelligence was perfectly sound - they said the British government's assessment and statements, at that time, were well-founded.

We conclude that, on the basis of the intelligence assessments at the time, covering both Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the Government's dossier, and by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, were well-founded.

The British government almost certainty received written summaries of the unauthentic documentary evidence in 2002, but the British did not get to examine the source documents upon which they were based until 2003. And so, somewhat cryptically, the Butler Report concludes:

The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it.

The committee's reasoning goes something like this: Even though a major plank of the British Government's case was riddled with woodworm (excuse the analogy), because British officials were not aware of the infestation at the time their assessment was made, the fact of the rot is irrelevant. Ministers acted in "good faith". And that would be not so unreasonable if it wasn't for the fact the Americans had repeatedly warned the British, which all but the first inquiry chose to play down.

Again, Josh Marshall: "The authors of the earlier report felt free to be candid about what the Butler Report chose to keep hidden - namely, that most of the British judgment about 'uranium from Africa' was based on the phony documents the Butler Report claims had nothing to do with their judgment." And he is more or less right. Nowhere does the Butler committee explicitly state that a crucial piece of intelligence reporting was based on forgeries - they simply can't bring themselves to say it. Instead they go trawling ex post facto through the British intelligence waste bin for any supporting material, play word games and try to make it appear as though poor Tony was inundated with endless reams of intelligence when the complete opposite is true - they sent out desperate appeals for more.




When the forced removal of Saddam Hussein became an urgent component of British policy toward the United States, friendly foreign intelligence services were asked for any information pertinent to Iraq. When intelligence was obtained - no matter how ropey - the British were inclined to make their own independent analysis and assessment, even if their preferred reading and interpretation of the information did not sit too well with the country that owned the reporting. As I think I have reasonably established, the British obtained seriously flawed intelligence reporting. When their American counterparts offered words of warning, the British response was to tone down the language in the dossier (a rare exception, let me assure you), but they could not bring themselves to drop the reporting entirely. And when the shit finally hit the fan and the documentary evidence collapsed, the supplemental intelligence reporting was elevated and forced to bear the weight of the government's uranium accusation almost alone. Then, later, when government officials had recomposed themselves, people like Hitchens were encouraged to inject new life into a badly rotten tale. So if there remains untested evidence not yet disclosed, I doubt now it will ever see the light of day, because Tony Blair needs ambiguity and confusion like a gladiator needs a protective shield – something both he and Bush can use to conceal their bloody red face.

Update: To further demonstrate the point, read how the Republican-led US Senate Intelligence Committee abused its power to protect President George Bush.